

C1AFGHAN 23-24 DEC

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ZNR UUUUU
R 240054Z DEC 86
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
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TO RUCLFVA/CG FOURTH MAW//02//
RUCLAKA/CDR9THPSYOPBN FT BRAGG NC//AFVS-POG-N-SSN//
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
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RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA AU//PAA//
RHAKAAA/18TFW KADENA AB JA//IN//
RHMRRARA/6922 ESS CLARK AB RP
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI
RUEHND/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
ACCT FBWA-EWDK

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MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

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Ton/Doug

*6-φ
Very useful
analysis - they
do this sort of
thing well!*

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SUBJ

<> TAKE 1 OF 2 --FBIS TRENDS-- 23 DEC 86 -- <><>USSR-AFGHANISTAN<><>
WA232127

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS

<> GORBACHEV LOWERS EXPECTATTIONS FOR EARLY <><>AFGHAN<><> SETTLEMENT
SUMMARY

<> DURING <><>AFGHAN<><> PARTY LEADER NAJIBULLAH'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW,
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV PLAYED DOWN THE PROSPECT OF AN EARLY
<> NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE <><>AFGHAN<><> CONFLICT. HIS FAINT PRAISE FOR
<> THE <><>AFGHAN<><> REGIME'S LIMITED SUCCESS IN SHORING UP ITS DOMESTIC
SUPPORT SUGGEST THAT GORBACHEV IS SEEKING TO DAMPEN THE SENSE OF
URGENCY ABOUT SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS THAT HE HAD EARLIER INSPIRED.
<> AS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILIZATION EFFORT, MOSCOW USED
NAJIBULLAH'S VISIT TO GIVE FULL ENDORSEMENT TO THE NEW <><>AFGHAN<><>
LEADERSHIP.

<> DURING THE 11-14 DECEMBER VISIT BY NAJIBULLAH AND THE TOP <><>AFGHAN<><>
<> LEADERSHIP--THE FIRST "OFFICIAL FRIENDLY VISIT" OF AN <><>AFGHAN<><> PARTY
LEADER TO MOSCOW IN SIX YEARS--GORBACHEV BLUNTLY INDICATED LOW
EXPECTATIONS THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WAS ON THE HORIZON AND NO
WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT:

-- IN HIS 12 DECEMBER DINNER SPEECH FOR NAJIBULLAH, GORBACHEV
EXPRESSED UNUSUAL PESSIMISM CONCERNING THE "PROCESS OF POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT" THROUGH UN-SPONSORED INDIRECT TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTANI
<> AND <><>AFGHAN<><> REPRESENTATIVES, OBSERVING THAT IT "HAS ITS BREAKDOWNS"
AND SOMETIMES "MARKS TIME," WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL "MOMENTS THAT
INSTILL OPTIMISM" (PRAVDA, 13 NOVEMBER). IN CONTRAST TO HIS
OPTIMISTIC FORECAST IN A 21 NOVEMBER INTERVIEW WITH INDIAN
JOURNALISTS THAT "THE DAY IS NOT FAR OFF" WHEN A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED (PRAVDA, 24 NOVEMBER), GORBACHEV ONLY
EXPRESSED THE "HOPE" THAT IT WOULD BE "POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING AND DECISIVE ACCORDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE." AT THE SAME
TIME HE GAVE LITTLE GROUNDS FOR SUCH HOPE, ASSERTING THAT ANY
PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT WOULD DEPEND ON "THE OTHER SIDE, FIRST
OF ALL THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION," AND CLAIMING THAT A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION "DOES NOT SUIT WASHINGTON," WHICH IS DOING "EVERYTHING TO
PERPETUATE" THE CONFLICT.

-- THE SOVIET LEADER DID NOT SUGGEST ANY ROOM FOR COMPROMISE ON
THE SOVIET TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT, REITERATING THE STANDARD SOVIET
POSITION THAT WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY WHEN
"A JUST SETTLEMENT" IS REACHED AND PLEDGING ONCE AGAIN THAT MOSCOW
<> "WOULD NOT ABANDON" THE <><>KABUL<><> REGIME IN "A DIFFICULT SITUATION."

GORBACHEV'S LESS SANGUINE VIEW OF THE SITUATION COMPARED WITH HIS
REMARKS WHILE IN INDIA LAST MONTH PROVIDES FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE
OPTIMISM HE DISPLAYED ON THAT OCCASION WAS LARGELY AIMED TO PARRY
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR IMMEDIATE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS.
GORBACHEV'S STRESS ON A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE ALSO CONTRASTS WITH
THE IMMEDIACY ABOUT A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL THAT HE CONVEYED IN HIS
REPORT TO THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY AND IN HIS 28 JULY

ASIAN POLICY SPEECH IN VLADIVOSTOK. AT THE CONGRESS HE SAID THAT MOSCOW DESIRED TO WITHDRAW SOVIET TROOPS "IN THE NEAREST FUTURE."

<> <>>AFGHAN<>> DOMESTIC SITUATION

ALONGSIDE HIS PESSIMISTIC REMARKS ON PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT, GORBACHEV'S DINNER SPEECH OFFERED AN EQUALLY GRIM ASSESSMENT OF THE KABUL REGIME'S PROGRESS THUS FAR IN BUILDING ITS POPULAR SUPPORT AND SEEMED TO REFLECT A BELIEF THAT
<> MOSCOW WILL HAVE TO KEEP ITS FORCES IN <>>AFGHANISTAN<>> FOR A LONG TIME.
<> REMARKING THAT AN "UNDERSTANDING" THAT THE <>>AFGHAN<>> REVOLUTION IS "IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE" IS ONLY "GRADUALLY PENETRATING THE
<> HEARTS AND MINDS OF <>>AFGHANS<>>," HE CAST DOUBT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE
<> <>>KABUL<>> REGIME'S EFFORTS OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS TO ATTRACT GREATER POPULAR SUPPORT. ON THE POLICY OF "NATURAL RECONCILIATION," WHICH
<> HAS BEEN HIGHLY TOUTED BY BOTH MOSCOW AND <>>KABUL<>> IN RECENT MONTHS AS A MEANS OF DRAWING OPPOSITION LEADERS INTO AFFILIATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT, GORBACHEV COULD ONLY SAY THAT POLICY'S "CONTOURS AND PROSPECTS" ARE "BEGINNING TO TAKE SHAPE."

STATEMENTS EARLIER THIS YEAR BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN MORE ENCOURAGING IN THIS REGARD. HE EVEN CLAIMED IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN SEPTEMBER THAT THE REGIME ALREADY HAD ATTAINED "THE SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION OF ALL SOCIAL STRATA . . . WITHOUT EXCEPTION" (TASS, 23 SEPTEMBER). GORBACHEV HAD BEEN LESS
<> EFFUSIVE IN JULY WHEN HE ENDORSED THE <>>AFGHAN<>> REGIME'S POLICY OF EXPANDING ITS BASE OF SUPPORT--BUT WITHOUT MAKING ANY CLAIMS FOR ITS SUCCESS (PRAVDA, 29 JULY). (MORE) [REDACTED] 23/21272

DEC

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SUBJ

- <> REF WA232127 FBIS TRENDS: <><>USSR-AFGHANISTAN//PRAVDA<><>, 29 JULY.
- <> TAKE 2 OF 2 --FBIS TRENDS-- 23 DEC 86 -- <><>USSR-AFGHANISTAN<><>
WA232205

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS
MEDIA COMMENTARY

- RECENT SOVIET COMMENTARIES HAVE PREPARED THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO REACH A RAPID INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION AND HAVE INSTEAD FOCUSED ON A LONGER TERM STRATEGY THAT COULD, IN
- <> THEORY, FORCE A SETTLEMENT ON THE <><>AFGHAN<><> REBELS BY BUILDING UP A
 - <> STABLE, SELF-SUPPORTING REGIME IN <><>KABUL<><>. THESE COMMENTARIES DO NOT INDICATE THAT MOSCOW ENVISIONS ABANDONING EFFORTS AIMED AT AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION, BUT THEY DO INDICATE THAT MOSCOW IS
 - <> PAINFULLY AWARE THAT WIDER SUPPORT FOR THE <><>KABUL<><> REGIME IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR A SETTLEMENT COMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET INTERESTS:

- YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV, DIRECTOR OF THE INFLUENTIAL USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE, HAS
- <> BEEN THE MOST ACTIVE PROPONENT OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE <><>AFGHAN<><> DOMESTIC SITUATION WILL ULTIMATELY BE DECISIVE AND THAT IT IS LEADING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. HE FIRST SUGGESTED IT ON SOVIET TELEVISION'S MAJOR WORLD AFFAIRS PROGRAM STUDIO 9 ON 6 OCTOBER, PREDICTING THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN "ONE WAY OR
 - <> ANOTHER" IF THE <><>AFGHAN<><> SITUATION WERE STABILIZED EVEN THOUGH NO "SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES" HAD BEEN ARRANGED. SINCE THEN, HE HAS RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT AT LEAST THREE TIMES IN SOVIET MEDIA-- IN REPORTS CARRIED ON 9 OCTOBER AND ON 18 AND 30 NOVEMBER BY TASS, SOVIET TELEVISION AND RADIO. IN HIS 18 NOVEMBER APPEARANCE ON SOVIET TELEVISION, FOR EXAMPLE, HE INSISTED THAT EVEN "WITHOUT GUARANTEES AGAINST INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE," STABILIZATION OF THE REGIME COULD STILL PERMIT WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, BUT THEIR DEPARTURE WOULD TAKE PLACE "LATER" THAN IT COULD THROUGH THE PREFERRED MEANS OF AN INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED AGREEMENT.

- ON THE SAME 18 NOVEMBER ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION, BOTH SOVIET AND AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS INDICATED CLEARLY THAT THE NAJIBULLAH LEADERSHIP HAD A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE IT COULD STAND ON ITS OWN. ALTHOUGH VIKTOR KORGUN OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ORIENTAL INSTITUTE INSISTED THAT "THIS IS FAR FROM A HOPELESS PROBLEM" AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE IS A "POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM IN THE NEAR FUTURE," HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SITUATION IS "VERY DIFFICULT." KORGUN ADDED THAT THE PARTY IS INEXPERIENCED AND ONLY TAKING "ITS FIRST STEPS" ALONG THE PATH OF RUNNING A SOCIETY, AND THAT THERE WERE A GREAT MANY "NATIONAL, RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER CONTRADICTIONS" HINDERING PROGRESS.
- <> FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> ROBERT NEUMANN, ANOTHER
 - <> PARTICIPANT IN THE TELEVISED DISCUSSION, CALLED THE <><>AFGHAN<><> SITUATION AN "IMPASSE" AND DWELT ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT THE RETURN OF "A THIRD OF THE POPULATION" CURRENTLY LIVING "A LIFE OF MISERY ABROAD." THE SOVIET-BACKED

- <> REGIME, HE SAID, HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN <><>KABUL<><> BY A "SUDDEN SEIZURE OF POWER DURING A MILITARY COUP THAT DID NOT HAVE THE EXTENSIVE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE," AND NO ONE WILL SUCCEED IN IMPOSING A SYSTEM ON THEM
- <> BECAUSE THE <><>AFGHANS<><> ARE "A NATION OF PROUD PEOPLE."

-- SUBSEQUENT TO GORBACHEV'S SPEECH FOR THE AFGHAN DELEGATION, IN HE 13 DECEMBER BROADCAST OF STUDIO 9 VADIM ZAGLADIN, FIRST DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CPSU INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, GAVE SECONDARY ATTENTION TO THE PROSPECTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AND INSTEAD

- <> STRESSED THAT "CHANGES OCCURRING IN <><>AFGHANISTAN<><> ITSELF" OFFER THE BEST HOPE FOR A SOLUTION. ASKING RHETORICALLY WHETHER THERE WAS HOPE FOR A QUICK SOLUTION, THE BEST HE COULD OFFER WAS THAT "WE ARE HOPING FOR THIS, BUT THE PROBLEM IS NOT QUITE THAT SIMPLE."

ENDORSEMENT OF LEADERSHIP

- <> WHILE GORBACHEV IN EFFECT MINIMIZED THE <><>KABUL<><> REGIME'S SUCCESS SO FAR IN SHORING UP ITS POSITION INSIDE THE COUNTRY, GORBACHEV'S WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE NAJIBULLAH MARKED A SYMBOLIC ENDORSEMENT OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP ONLY THREE WEEKS AFTER FORMER LEADER BABRAK KARMAL WAS OUSTED FROM HIS REMAINING POSTS AS POLITBURO MEMBER AND
- <> CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (PRESIDENT). THE LARGE <><>AFGHAN<><>
- <> DELEGATION, CONSISTING OF THE <><>DRA<><>'S TOP LEADERS, WAS GIVEN FULL PROTOCOL COURTESIES BY MEETING WITH AN EQUALLY HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET DELEGATION. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH NAJIBULLAH DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS "FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE" IN HIS 12 DECEMBER DINNER SPEECH, MOSCOW'S AUTHORITATIVE REPORT GAVE A WHOLLY POSITIVE CHARACTERIZATION IN DESCRIBING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE TALKS AS "WARM AND CORDIAL" AND MANIFESTING "FULL CONCURRENCE" ON ALL QUESTIONS DISCUSSED (PRAVDA, 13 DECEMBER). FURTHER UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE THAT MOSCOW ATTACHED TO THE VISIT, GORBACHEV IN HIS DINNER SPEECH STATED THAT THE VISIT WAS NOT "ROUTINE," TAKING PLACE "AT A CRUCIAL STAGE IN THE HISTORY OF THE NEW <><>AFGHANISTAN<><>."

THE LAST "OFFICIAL FRIENDLY VISIT" TO MOSCOW BY AN <><>AFGHAN<><> PARTY LEADER WAS BABRAK KARMAL'S VISIT IN OCTOBER 1980, LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION. ON THAT OCCASION MOSCOW WAS SIMILARLY ATTENTIVE TO DISPLAYING ITS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE LARGE DELEGATION

<> OF TOP <><>AFGHAN<><> LEADERS ACCOMPANYING KARMAL. (ENDALL) AG 32

23/2235Z DEC

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Didn't know that